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Defendant/Appellant Wyoming and Colorado Railroad Company, 
Inc. ("WYCO"), hereby respectfully submits the following arguments 
in response to the Brief of Appellee filed in this appeal by 
Plaintiff/Appellee Susan White ("White"). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
WYCO has Marshalled the Evidence. 
White's first contention is that WYCO has failed to marshall 
the evidence. White's only example of such alleged failure deals 
with testimony concerning the production of the Trust Deed Note to 
opposing counsel prior to trial. However, the only testimony which 
WYCO admits it inadvertently failed to mention was the biased 
testimony of White herself concerning the issue. Although all 
appellants are expected to marshall the evidence, an oversight 
concerning the testimony of one witness is not grounds for this 
Court to simply assume that the trial court's findings of fact are 
all correct, pursuant to Alta Indust. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 
1286-87 (Utah 1993). WYCO has made a good faith effort to marshall 
the evidence and should not be penalized for an inadvertent 
oversight. 
II. 
WYCO did not fail to Comply with a Court Order 
to Produce Documents. 
White's next contention is that the trial court properly 
refused to allow the Trust Deed Note or testimony concerning it 
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into evidence at the trial, because WYCO failed to comply with a 
court order to produce the document prior to trial. However, as 
White admits on page 10 of her Brief, the documents sought, which 
were later declared to not exist by Judge Roth, were solely those 
"showing the transfer of any monies to the pension plan." 
Documentary evidence of the transfer of monies would include such 
things as regular checks, cashiers checks, money orders, receipt of 
funds by wire transfer, or receipts for cash. A trust deed note is 
not a document showing the transfer of monies but evidencing an 
obligation. Thus, Judge Roth's ruling did not apply to the Trust 
Deed, Trust Deed Note, or Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure. Judge West 
misunderstood the import of Judge Roth's order and improperly 
refused to admit the Trust Deed Note or testimony concerning the 
underlying obligation at the trial of this matter. Such abuse of 
discretion requires the reversal of the trial court's judgment. 
III. 
WYCO did Produce a Copy of the Trust Deed Note 
Prior to Trial. 
White's counsel continues his incessant argument from trial 
that the Trust Deed was not produced prior to trial. However, the 
evidence of such production is clearly in favor of WYCO. The 
testimony of Douglas Durban© was clear on this issue. In addition, 
Mr. Merrill would have corroborated Mr. Durbano's testimony 
concerning the practice in their law firm to maintain documents 
which had been provided to the other side in a certain section of 
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the file, in which section was found the Trust Deed Note. White 
argues that the trial court refused to allow Mr. Merrill to draw 
that conclusion. However, what the trial court did was not allow 
circumstantial evidence concerning the disclosure of the document. 
Although Mr. Merrill did testify that he did not personally deliver 
or cause to be delivered the Trust Deed Note to opposing counsel, 
such testimony does not support any conclusion that the document 
was never disclosed. 
White next relies on her own testimony that the Trust Deed 
Note was not brought to the depositions of the parties. However, 
not only does this testimony not establish that the document was 
never disclosed, but it is offset totally by the testimony of David 
Durbano, although arguably equally biased. The final witness who 
testified on the subject was Phil Scott who, at the time of his 
deposition, was still working for WYC0 and testified at his 
deposition that he had seen the Trust Deed Note in 1988. However, 
at the time of trial, Mr. Scott had been terminated as an employee 
of WYCO and thus, his testimony that he now "specifically remembers 
the Note was not produced that day," should have been highly 
suspect and totally incredible to the trial court. To impune the 
testimony of a licensed attorney based upon such biased testimony 
was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and 
should be reversed by this Court. 
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IV. 
White has Admitted the Existence of the Trust Deed Note. 
White cannot controvert the evidence in the record concerning 
her admissions as to the existence of the Trust Deed Note, as 
referenced in WYCO's Opening Brief. Instead, White refers to 
comments made by Judge West at the trial. However, as explained 
previously, Judge West really misunderstood Judge Roth's order 
concerning what had been requested and what would therefore be 
precluded. It did not include the Trust Deed Note and White7s 
clear admissions as to the existence of the Note should preclude 
here from arguing that it could not be submitted at trial. 
V. 
Testimony Concerning the Obligation Underlying 
the Trust Deed Should not have been Precluded by 
Either the Parole or Best Evidence Rules. 
White's next argument centers on the refusal of the trial 
court to admit testimony concerning the underlying obligation of 
the Trust Deed, based upon the Parole Evidence Rule. White 
continues to miss the mark on this issue. The Parole Evidence Rule 
precludes any evidence of the "contents" of a writing other than 
the writing itself. However, the testimony which Judge West 
precluded was not concerning the specific contents of the Trust 
Deed Note but was concerning the obligation underlying the Trust 
Deed. Even if the evidence could have been precluded to prove the 
wording of the Trust Deed Note, it should not have been precluded 
to establish the obligation between WYCO and the Plan underlying 
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the Trust Deed. Indeed, there is nothing to prevent the obligation 
underlying a Trust Deed from being a verbal agreement as opposed to 
a document in writing. For that reason, Judge West's ruling 
concerning the Parole Evidence Rule should be reversed. 
White also contends that testimony concerning the obligation 
underlying the Trust Deed was properly precluded by the trial court 
based upon the Best Evidence Rule, as Rules 1001 through 1008 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence are commonly called. Again, the 
testimony which was proffered was not necessarily to prove the 
specific content of a writing, but was submitted to establish the 
obligation underlying the Trust Deed. White attempts to 
distinguish the case of Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982), 
based upon the fact that it was a paternity action. However, 
although the action was a different one than the one at bar, the 
holding in Roods is certainly applicable. In Roods, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that testimony can be submitted to prove a fact 
which has an existence independent of any written document. Id. at 
642. The loan which WYCO made and the funds which WYCO paid to the 
Plan, so that the Plan could pay White her money, are facts which 
are independent of the Trust Deed Note itself. For that reason, 
testimony should have been allowed concerning the facts surrounding 
the loan which was made. Thus, neither the Parole Evidence nor 
Best Evidence Rules should have precluded testimony concerning the 
obligation underlying the Trust Deed, and the trial courts ruling 
based upon these Rules should be reversed. 
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VI. 
The Statute of Frauds Should not have Precluded 
Testimony Concerning the Obligation Underlying 
the Trust Deed. 
White argues that the Trust Deed Note was intended to claim an 
interest in real property and must, therefore, be in writing, 
citing U.C.A. §25-5-1• However, White gives no legal precedence 
for such statement. The document which is intended to create an 
interest in real property is obviously the Trust Deed itself, not 
the Trust Deed Note. Indeed there is no legal precedence that the 
obligation underlying a trust deed must be in writing. Affirmance 
by this Court of the trial court's ruling will create such a 
precedence, that even if a trust deed is in writing, properly 
notarized and recorded, it will have absolutely no validity unless 
the underlying obligation is also in writing. This is a 
misapplication of the statute of frauds and, for that reason, the 
Court should reverse the trial court's ruling on this issue. 
In addition, §25-5-8 of the statute of frauds provides for 
contracts to be taken out of the operation of the statute, based 
upon part performance. In such cases, testimony must be allowed to 
establish by clear and unequivocal evidence the existence of a 
contract, which would normally be unenforceable based upon the 
statute of frauds, but which is then taken out of the operation of 
the statute by part performance. Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 
538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975); Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. 
Ballard, 534 P.2d 611, 613-15 (Utah 1975). However, without 
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allowing testimony on the issue, it is impossible to establish the 
existence of an oral agreement which should be excused from 
operation of the statute of frauds. This is precisely what 
happened in the case at bar. This Court should find that the trial 
court abused its discretion in refusing to allow testimony 
concerning the obligation underlying the Trust Deed based upon the 
statute of frauds. 
VII. 
The Trust Deed was a Valid and Enforceable Document 
Which Created an Interest in the Real Property in 
Favor of WYCO. 
White next contends that the Trust Deed and Deed in Lieu of 
Foreclosure did not transfer an interest in the real property to 
WYCO, for lack of consideration. No evidence was submitted to the 
trial court concerning the alleged invalidity of the Deed in Lieu 
of Foreclosure. The court only found the Deed in Lieu invalid 
based upon a finding that the Trust Deed itself was invalid. Thus, 
the only issue before this Court is the validity of the Trust Deed 
itself. White cites Banaerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983) 
in support of her argument that no consideration existed for the 
Trust Deed. However, Banaerter supports reversal of the trial 
court's holding as opposed to affirmance. 
In Banaerter, the trial court found that a valid Trust Deed 
Note was not in existence, in that it had not been signed. 
However, in spite of the lack of a written promissory note, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding by other evidence 
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submitted that the underlying obligation did exist which supported 
the Trust Deed. Id. at 101-02. Had Judge West been willing to 
consider all the evidence which was presented concerning the 
existence of the obligation underlying the subject Trust Deed, a 
similar finding that the Trust Deed was supported by valid 
consideration would have followed. Indeed, pursuant to Bangerter, 
the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider such 
additional evidence. Based upon the record before this Court, a 
debt existed in this case which supports the Trust Deed. For that 
reason, the trial court should be reversed. 
White also cites Beehive Security Co. v. Bush, 400 P.2d 506 
(Utah 1965) in support of her argument on consideration. However, 
Bush is totally inapplicable to the case at bar. In Bush, the 
extrinsic evidence which the trial court allowed concerning a 
promissory note and mortgage established that no consideration ever 
flowed from Beehive Security Co. to Mr. Bush, in exchange for a 
note and mortgage. In other words, the mortgage was a sham. Based 
on such evidence, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
finding that the mortgage and underlying promissory note were void. 
Id. at 507. These facts are as opposite to the facts in the case 
at bar as could be. In this case, the evidence clearly established 
that money flowed from WYCO to the Plan as a loan, for which the 
Plan gave WYCO the subject Trust Deed as security. This is not a 
case where the consideration was never received, as in Bush. For 
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that reason, Bush does not support White's contention concerning 
consideration. 
To the extent appropriate, both Banaerter and Bush were 
effectively overruled by Barlow Soc. v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 723 
P.2d 398 (Utah 1986) , which held that any deed is valid with or 
without consideration. Id. at 401. White's contention of lack of 
consideration is truly a red herring, intended to distract the 
Court's focus from the real issues in this case. 
White also attacks the validity of the Trust Deed based upon 
the fact that the legal description for 2.68 acres of the land was 
not created until three months after the Trust Deed was executed, 
suggesting that it was executed sometime later. It is interesting 
to note that in her attack on the date the instrument was actually 
signed, White failed to present testimony of the notary public who 
notarized the document, whose testimony would have no doubt been 
the most credible on that issue. The only explanation for this is 
that the notary would have testified that the document was signed 
on the date it was purported to be signed. It is clear from the 
record that when WYCO loaned the Plan the money which White 
received, the Trust Deed was executed at that time and the legal 
description was corrected to include the additional 2.68 acres some 
three months later when the additional legal description had been 
created. The addition of the newly created legal description, 
three months after the execution of the Trust Deed, with full 
9 
knowledge of all parties to the Trust Deed, was a correction and 
not an alteration or forgery. 
In addition to the case of Rasmussen v. Olsen. 583 P.2d 50 
(Utah 1978), which was dealt with in WYCO's Opening Brief, White 
also cites the case of Losee v. Jones, 235 P.2d 132 (Utah 1951) in 
support of her argument that the addition of the 2.68 acres to the 
legal description made the Trust Deed void. As White admits in her 
Brief, Losee is not at all similar to the case before this Court. 
In Losee, the trial court apparently concluded that a certain 
deed "was void for the further reason that it had been altered." 
Id. at 135.1 From the opinion of the case, it is difficult to 
determine what the alteration was, although the case states that 
Mrs. Jones made "certain corrections on one deed." Id. at 133. 
However, the reading of the case certainly implies that the 
correction was made without any knowledge on the part of the 
grantee, making her execution of the deed questionable. However, 
like Rasmussen, Losee does not support a similar finding in this 
case, since all parties to the subject Trust Deed knew that the 
additional legal description would need to be added sometime after 
xWhite has totally misquoted Losee to make it appear that the 
Utah Supreme Court affirmed the ruling concerning the altered deed. 
White cited the Court as stating: "The court accordingly agrees 
that neither the plaintiff nor the defendants are the owners of the 
property . . . ." Brief of Appellee, p. 23 (emphasis added). The 
Court actually stated: "The court (meaning the trial court) 
accordingly decreed that neither the plaintiffs nor defendants are 
the owners of the property in question, . . .." Losee, 235 P.2d at 
135 (parenthesis and emphasis added). It is hoped that this 
misquote was done unintentionally. 
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execution of the Trust Deed. The Utah Supreme Court in Losee went 
on to state that "No question is raised as to that latter ruling." 
Id. at 133. It appears from this comment that not only did the 
Court not affirm the trial court7s finding, since that issue was 
not raised on appeal, but the language of this sentence implies 
that the Court may have found differently had the issue been 
appealed. Thus, White can find no comfort in the holding in Losee. 
White also attacks the validity of the Trust Deed by 
continuing to allege that it violated a court order. It is 
interesting that White has totally skirted WYCO's argument on this 
issue, that the Minute Entry issued by Judge Roth contained nothing 
concerning encumbrance, and that by acquiescence in the dismissal 
of the other action some six months later, White has waived her 
right to this argument. Instead, White has made a wild supposition 
that WYCO failed to address the application of Judge Roth's order 
because the Trust Deed was executed years later. There is 
absolutely no evidence in the record that supports such a 
supposition, and the Court is left to ponder why White felt this 
was her best argument on this issue. 
VIII. 
The Trust Deed did not Violate the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act. 
At the conclusion of her Brief, White argues that the Trust 
Deed and Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure violated the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act. There is no evidence in the record that 
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the Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure in any way violated the Act. The 
trial court only found the Deed in Lieu invalid because it was 
based upon a Trust Deed, which the court had incorrectly found 
invalid. Thus, the only issue before this Court dealing with the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is whether the Trust Deed violated 
the Act or not. 
White first addresses §25-6-5 of the Act and asserts that 6 of 
the 11 badges of fraud are found in this particular case. The 
first assertion, based upon subsection (a) , is that the transfer or 
obligation was to an insider. White tries to make this badge fit 
the facts, torturing the definition of insider. However, her 
attempt fails. The debtor under the Trust Deed was the Plan. 
Since the creditor, WYCO, is not a director, officer or person in 
control of the Plan, WYCO is certainly not an insider under the 
statute. Although David Durbano is affiliated with both the Plan 
and WYCO, this does not create an insider as defined in the 
statute. 
White next cites subsection (b) concerning retention of 
possession or control after transfer. This badge is also not 
applicable, since it was the Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure which 
transferred the property. Since the Trust Deed only encumbered the 
property, subsection (b) is not applicable. White next cites 
subsection (c) concerning disclosure or concealment. The Plan did 
not conceal the encumbrance, nor was it under any duty to disclose 
it. In fact, in the absence of any other option to raise the money 
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required by the court order to be paid to White, it should have 
been obvious to her that the Plan would have incurred an obligation 
to do so. Thus, this badge of fraud is also not applicable. 
White next argues that subsection (d) applies, concerning suit 
or threat of suit. Although this is the only badge of fraud which 
is somewhat applicable, it should not be used against the Plan 
under the circumstances of this case. It was pursuant to the prior 
lawsuit against the Plan that it was required to pay to White 
$35,000.00 and pledged the subject property to WYCO in exchange for 
that amount plus $10,000.00 in attorney's fees. If this badge is 
considered by the Court, the weight given it should be minimal. 
White argues that subsection (e) applies, that the transfer 
was of substantially all of the Plan's assets. In the first place, 
the Plan had substantial equity in other property in 1988, at the 
time the Trust Deed was entered into. In addition, the subsequent 
transfer of the property by Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure in 1990, 
which at that time was substantially all its assets, is not the 
event which could violate the Act. For that reason, subsection (e) 
is not applicable. Likewise, subsection (i) concerning insolvency 
is also not applicable. The Plan did have more assets than 
liabilities in 1988, even after the encumbrance of the Trust Deed. 
Based upon the definition of insolvency in §25-6-3 of the Act, that 
the debts are greater than the assets, the Plan was not insolvent 
after the obligation was incurred. Thus, with only one possible 
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badge of fraud involved, the Trust Deed did not violate §25-6-5 of 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
White contends that §25-6-6 of the Act was also violated. 
However, contrary to White's allegations, the Trust Deed was 
executed prior to her claim. There was ample evidence produced at 
trial, although not considered by Judge West, that reasonably 
equivalent consideration flowed at the time the Trust Deed was 
executed. In addition, the encumbrance did not involve an insider 
and the Plan had equity in other property at the time of execution 
of the Trust Deed in 1988. Therefore, White is not entitled to 
have the Trust Deed and Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure invalidated. 
The fact that the documents were finally recorded on May 18, 1990, 
in anticipation of a deficiency action, does not change any of the 
above. In addition, David Durbano did not testify that the Plan 
had no assets in 1988, as alleged by White, but testified to just 
the opposite. Thus, §25-6-6 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 
was also not violated by the subject Trust Deed. 
White further argues that the Trust Deed was for an antecedent 
debt, claiming that it was not executed on or before December 22, 
1988. The trial court did not find that the Trust Deed was 
executed after that date. Thus, there is no basis upon which White 
can argue that it was for an antecedent debt. Since the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act has not been violated, the trial court 
should be reversed on this issue as well. 
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IX. 
WYCO has not Misrepresented the Trial Testimony. 
Whiter final argument is that WYCO has misrepresented the 
testimony which was presented at trial, by failing to advise this 
Court that her standing objection concerning certain testimony was 
eventually granted by the trial court. However, it is precisely 
the grant of her objection that forms the basis of this Appeal. 
The trial court abused its discretion in granting the objection and 
refusing to consider the testimony which had been proffered. By 
way of examples, the trial court should have considered the 
testimony establishing consideration for the Trust Deed, the 
disclosure of the Trust Deed Note to opposing counsel prior to 
trial, White's admission of the existence of the Trust Deed Note, 
the validity of the Trust Deed, and the Plan's equity in other 
property at the time of execution of the Trust Deed. Thus, White's 
request for Rule 11 sanctions is inappropriate and is a further 
effort to focus the Court's attention away from the real issues in 
this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the record before this Court, it is clear that when 
White was paid $35,000.00 pursuant to court order, the Plan had no 
liquid assets from which to make that payment. For that reason, 
the Plan borrowed the money from WYCO, a totally separate entity, 
and executed a Trust Deed in favor of WYCO to secure the loan. 
When the Plan fell into default with WYCO, primarily due to White's 
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successful litigation against it, the Plan cured the default by 
executing a Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure in favor of WYCO, 
transferring the subject property. The transfer was not done 
improperly or with any intent to defraud White, who had already 
received the $35,000.00 borrowed from WYCO. 
Based upon all the arguments above, as well as those contained 
in WYCO's Opening Brief, together with the record before this 
Court, WYCO respectfully requests that the Court reverse the trial 
court's ruling and grant judgment in favor of WYCO. In the 
alternative, WYCO requests the Court to remand this matter for a 
new trial. 
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